Case Study – Public Procurement Big Contracting

Another activity of our project Improve Integrity of Public Contractors was the preparation of two case studies for two large public contracts and procurements. The objects of the first one is the Concessionary Agreement for the financing, design, renovation, supply, reorganization and functioning of the PPP concessionary for providing laboratory services to hospitals, regional and municipal ones. The second case study refers to the procedure for Buying uniforms for the State Police for several years.

The first procedure is a procedure conducted in 2017 and finalized with a contract being awarded only in 2019. The selection was done through an open tender and a consortium of several companies was selected as the winner, [1]with these companies established a concessionary company later[2]. The procedure was followed by wide debate about the selection of the winning operator, as one of the companies of the winning consortium was registered in a country under the shell regime. The local authorities did not demonstrate any efforts to make any verifications of the integrity of this company or to check for potential conflicts of interest of its owner(s).

The case study developed as part of the project identified some wrong procedures that had already been opposed by the Government-contracted Consultant. Upon review of this case study, it was found that:

1) The Contracting Authority – the Ministry of Health, did not meet one of the essential conditions provided by the Law and Regulations on concessions/PPPs, namely: The legal obligation of comparing the PPP Model with the Public procurement to prove the cost effectiveness of the PPP project compared to the Public procurement, which would allow for the development of this Project;

2) The Contracting Authority has not published any reference for the financial analysis based on technical, quantitative, or statistical elements for the laboratory services as the basis for calculating the value of the Project in the amount of 13,005,966,000 lekë, without VAT;

3) The Implementation of the Laboratory Project for almost the entire Territory of the Republic of Albania carries an edit risk for the Public party, because in case of failure, this could lead to collapse of the Public laboratory system, which would be a health catastrophe;

4) The Contracting Authority has failed to deliver on its commitment to reduce the social impact of the project.

5) The Winner of the Project is selected in contradiction with the legal framework on concession/PPPs, the criteria published by The Contracting Authority, and without taking into consideration the Opinion of the IFC international expert;

6) The contract does not provide for one of the main insurances for projects of this nature, such as “Insurance of Professional Liability”.

Find the Case Study HERE (Albanian) and Here ( English)

The case of central purchases represents the highest value tender held so far by the Central Purchasing Authority. This tender is held on behalf of the State Police Directorate. The procedure selected for contracting in this case is a particular procedure rarely used, given its limits regarding the high monetary values. What is interesting is that this tender is being held at the same time the project is implemented. This case was selected given the problems already evident with the type of procedure followed[3], already excluding interested operators from competing by selecting them through the limited procedure

Find the Case Study – Here ( Albanian)




On the implementation of the Project: Monitoring Conflict of Interest of Donors for the 2017 Electoral Campaign

In the framework of its Monitoring Conflict of Interest of Donors for the 2017 Electoral Campaign Project, AIS has identified the donors of the electoral contestants for the 2017 general elections.

Identification was made taking into consideration their economic interests, benefits from public procurement, and incomes from payments received from the state budget (treasury transactions).

We have also compared the list of identified donors with that of the debtors to the tax authorities to see whether any of these donors owe money to state institutions.

It is a total of 66 private individuals and business companies declared as electoral donors in 2017 according to the financial reports published on the website of the Central Election Commission. This includes only donors, who have donated more than 100 000 lekë[1].

Online financial reporting is a new development for the electoral subjects. They have also been subject to financial auditing by independent certified accountants appointed by the Central Election Commission through a lot procedure. Significant differences are found between the self-declared financial reports, though, and the findings of the auditors[2]. This is an indication of two issues: a. Problems with the professional capacity of the political party finance officers, b. Fictitious reporting, i.e. data not reflected on the parties’ online financial reporting are found by the auditors during and after the electoral campaign.


Discrete Cases: Among the 66 identified donors, there are two in particular, who seem to be in a conflict of interest referring to Article 89 of the Electoral Code.


The Code provides that: Legal persons and any shareholder thereof shall not be allowed to donate funds if they meet in any of the following conditions: a) has benefitted public funds, public contracts, or concessions over the two last years by the amount of more than 10 million lekë; b) exercise an activity in the area of media; c) has been a partner in public funds in various projects; ç) has outstanding monetary debts to the state budget or any public institution. This obligation shall not apply when a shareholder owns his shares as a result of a public offer.


The law, however, does not provide for certain conflicts of interest regarding public funds, assets, or services. This includes donors, who have benefitted from programs of public subsidies, loans guaranteed by public funds, privatization of public assets, legalization, or public programs for business support.


In order to identify cases of conflicts of interest already foreseen by the law (Article 89, point 2 of the Electoral Code), the following steps, we took the following steps:

  • Identified business companies owned by individual donors (donor being the owner and shareholder at the same time). Source of information: National Business Center.
  • Checked whether these individual donors had benefitted from public contracts through public procurement. Source of verification: Open Procurement Albania Database and the website of the Public Procurement Agency.
  • Checked whether these donors are in the list of tax debtors. The list is publicly available online on the website of the General Tax Directorate.
  • Checked whether these donors have been partners in, or direct beneficiaries of, public funds. For that, we consulted the payments made by the state treasury. We only searched for direct beneficiaries, and not for co-contractors, where it is only the leading beneficiary, and not all the beneficiaries reflected as receivers of state money.


Difficulties and challenges with the verification process:

  • Information about donors owing money to public institutions. The list of tax debtors is the only source of verification available for this kind of information. There are no data about other forms of debts to the state, like contractual damages or outstanding payments of extra fees, which are not reflected on the list of taxes collected by the General Tax Directorate.
  • The information available about public tenders or treasure transactions refers only to the leading contractor in case of joint tenders (two or more business companies awarded a public contract). Therefore, even though not on the list of beneficiaries, co-contractors in this case still benefit under the name of the leading contractor.
  • The definition for ‘shareholder’ in the law leaves room for interpreting whether provisions on the conflicts of interest refer also to the company partners. Shareholders in our verification process include anyone, who owns a part of the capital of a legal and economic entity.


Our verification of direct donors includes:

  • 66 monetary or ‘in kind’ donors declared by the political parties on their online financial reports on the website of the Central Election Commission.
  • 64 individual donors and 2 legal persons (“K&H Law Firm shpk” as an ‘in kind’ donor of People’s Alliance for Justice Party and “Linda 80 shpk” as an ‘in kind’ donor of the Albanian Demo-Christian Union Party).
  • The legal person registered as “Linda 80 shpk” seems to be in a conflict of interest if we refer to Article 89, point 3(a) of the electoral law. There is no information whether this company has signed a declaration for preventing conflict of interest. The company is public tenders and contracts above the foreseen value over the last two years. Its passport[3] is awarded the following tenders with municipalities and the health sector: a total of 17 contracts with local government authorities, including 2 municipalities and 12 contracting authorities in the amount of 81 400 902 lekë (eighty one million four hundred thousand and nine hundred and two) Albanian Lekë; 5 contracts in the health sector with two contracting authorities in a total amount of 5 324 516 (five million three hundred twenty four thousand and five hundred and sixteen) Albanian Lekë. Our verification with the state treasury transactions show that the company is paid a total of 144 460 120 (one hundred forty for million four hundred sixty and one hundred twenty) Albanian Lekë for two years (June 2015 – June 2017). This company may, therefore, not be a donor in elections. It is worth noting that the information provided in the financial auditors’ reports by the independent certified accountants do not include any assessment of compliance with Article 89, point 3 of the electoral law. Such reports do not mention whether any declarations on conflicts of interest was signed by the donors, which is an obligation both for the donors and the political parties receiving donations. Auditors do provide, though, data on the ‘in kind’ donors on Table 2 “Incomes” of the report, confirming declarations made by the political parties themselves on their online financial reports.
  • The other company, K&H Law Firm shpk, does not seem to have received any payments from public funds, public contracts, or owe any money to the tax authorities.
  • None of the companies is on the list of tax debtors of the General Tax Directorate.

Verification of the individual donors registered as legal persons.

  • Out of the 64 individual donors (who have donated more than 100 thousand lekë) of the political parties in elections, 64 seem to be associated with 42 entities registered by a tax number.
  • Verifying whether a private individual corresponds with that of a donor on the list of donors was difficult, because the National Business center provides only a partial identification of entities registered by a tax number (number of passport or identity card).
  • However, individual donors registered with the tax authorities (by the same name and surname) did not seem to have benefitted from tenders or payments from the state treasury, so there was no need for any further investigations.
  • Regarding debts to the public institutions, one of the donors, E.S, is a shareholder (by 5% of the shares) in Royal Farma, a company registered by Tax Number  L01606005J, and a debtor in the March 2018 List of Debtors of the General Tax Directorate since 2014. Source of information: List of taxpayers with a mortgage burden as a guarantee for their outstanding taxes. The individual donor, therefore, falls under the prohibition provision of Article 89, point 3 of the electoral law.


Donations from media companies: Monitoring conflicts of interest as per Article 89, letter b, turned out to be a sensitive process following the legal amendments made prior to the 2017 electoral campaign, allowing for free air time. Such legal provision falls contrary to Article 89, point 3/b of the electoral law, which prohibits entities exercising activities in the area of media from donating funds for electoral purposes. Thus, several political parties have declared donations consisting of free airtime.

Airtime for electoral purposes is sometimes reported as a donation, sometimes as a bill to be paid.

Nevertheless, the funding of electoral subjects by media entities must be carefully seen from the perspective of legal amendments expected to be made.

Public officials as donors of electoral subject. The list of donors includes many high-ranking public officials, including the current President of the Republic, who was just voted as President at them time, but not yet under oath.

AIS has also prepared some draft amendments for more efficient regulation by the Electoral Code regarding transparency and monitoring of the conflict of interest of donors of the electoral subjects.


Some of our conclusions for a more efficient regulation by the electoral law include:

  1. Information in real time on donations for electoral purposes (monetary donations). This regulation is based on Article 9, paragraph 3 of the Constitution, which provides that “The financial sources of the political parties, as well as their expenditures, shall always be made public”. Such regulation has already been in the Electoral Code, but it was removed with the amendments made to Article 90, paragraph 1, which provided that: The list of persons who donate no less than 100 thousand lekë, and the corresponding amounts, shall always be made public. However, the changes made by Law No. 74, dated 19.07.2012, this sentence was removed, marking thus regress with the right to information about the supporters of a political party through donations even before the election day.
  2. The law must clearly prohibit any donation, subsidy, or loan relation between the electoral subjects and the media entities. The article on conflict of interest, i.e. Article 89 of the Electoral Code, excludes entities, which exercise media activities, or are shareholders in such entities, from being donors of electoral subjects. This is in line with the principle pf the independence of the media and separation of the two powers. Article 84, paragraph 6 of the Electoral Code, on the other hand, introduces an additional financial source for the important political parties. Media is thus obliged by law to donate airtime to the political parties, which have already used a certain part of paid advertising. This article must be abrogated, because: 1. it creates donation relations that fall contrary to the provisions under Article 98; 2. creates difficulties for monitoring; 3. is arbitrarily used even in local elections, even though it must only apply to the general elections; 4. It’s not a situation where political parties have problems paying for advertising. Political advertising has become quite massive in election media coverage and, ideally, all subjects must be rather focusing more on the quality, instead of the quantity of their message and advertising.

It is also the time, where media, including audio-visual media, is not limited to licensed national media only. There is a variety of audio-visual coverage nowadays base on the new technology.

The regulation of free advertising made through changes to the Law on Political parties in May 2017 is equally wrong and contradictory to the current Electoral Code.

The new Electoral Code shall have to be exhaustive in prohibiting donations by media to electoral subjects. Media entities must be only allowed to enter commercial agreements with electoral subjects, which should, ideally, be accessible to the public if such agreements are related with elections. Outstanding bills and taxes must also be carefully seen. Commercial entities do certainly have the right to claim payment of the invoices they have issued. However, when the debtor is a political party in power, this could be intimidating. In order to prevent situations, where debts are turned into donations, the electoral law must also enable the Central Election Commission to intervene when distributing the annual or electoral fund to the parties, giving priority to outstanding and recognized obligations during electoral campaigns. The same priority should also apply to public funds when such funds are allocated to parties to owe money to non-media entities.

  1. More effective regulation of cases foreseen as donors’ conflicts of interest. Legal provisions must be expanded to also include prevention, declaration, and conflict of interest for donors. Article 89 of the Electoral Code does include some prohibitions. This article also needs to be better regulated and expanded. Thus, the word ‘shareholder’ should be rather replaced by the word ‘owner’. In addition to public contracts and public funds, benefits from programs of public subsidies must also be foreseen as conflict of interest, as well as loans guaranteed by public funds, benefits from privatization of public assets, benefits from legalization; benefits from public programs supporting business, etc.
  2. Introduction of a legal provision on administrative verification of cases of conflict of interest. It would be useful to give the CEC the authority to make administrative verifications and investigation. This could be done through requests for information addressed to public institutions on compliance with the legal provisions on conflicts of interest. This could include verification with the tax authorities about tax debtors, Public Procurement Agency about public contracts, Concessionary Register about concessionary contracts, and so on. Sanctions on false declarations on conflict of interest could also be introduced in the Electoral Code.





Open Government Data on the Web: A Semantic Approach

Julia Hoxha
Institute of Applied Informatics and Formal Description Methods (AIFB)
Karlsruhe Institute of Technology, Germany
Armand Brahaj
FIZ Karlsruhe – Leibniz Institute for Information Infrastructure, Germany

Initiatives of making government data open are continuously gaining interest recently. While this presents immense benefits for increasing transparency, the problem is that the data are frequently offered in heterogeneous formats, missing clear semantics that clarify what the data describe. The data are displayed in ways, which are not always clearly understandable to a broad range of user communities that need to make informed decisions. We address these problems and propose an overall approach, in which raw statistical data independently gathered from the different government institutions are formally and semantically represented, based on an ontology that we present in this paper. We further introduce the approach deployed in publishing these data in alignment with Linked Data principles, as well as present the methods implemented to query single or combined dataset and visualize the results in understandable ways. The introduced approach enables data integration, leading to vast opportunities for information exchange, analysis on combined datasets, simplicity to create mashups, and exploration of innovative ways to use these data creatively.

Link to publication:

[JHoxha_ABrahaj] OpenGovernmentDataontheWeb-ASemanticApproach

Utilization Cases of Open Data Albania

Julia Hoxha` and Aranita Brahaj*

`Institute of Applied Informatics and Formal Description Methods,
Karlsruhe Institute of Technology, Karlsruhe, Germany

 *Albanian Institute of Science, Tirana, Albania  

In this paper, we describe Open Data Albania (ODA) project and concrete cases of open data utilization. ODA aims at providing open datasets of valuable information which can be structured, analyzed and presented in different forms leading to intuitive knowledge representations. Besides the datasets, the project has also produced analytical studies based on the data and insightful visualizations to make the knowledge understandable and easy to utilize by different communities.

The platform where the data is published online is the most prominent one for open data in Albania and very popular between the journalists, who are continuously using data from ODA to provide the public with information on different social-economic aspects. In many cases, the project has been used in direct advocacy initiatives. In this paper, we described a set of cases where the data is utilized by different groups, such as government institutions, NGOs, media, and academia.

To read the paper



Fiscal Impact Assessment of Structural Reforms – Case Study on Albania

The country case studies in this volume represent just such an in-depth needs assessment for countries in the region, on an issue that is both critical and insufficiently addressed: how the fiscal impacts of structural reforms are integrated within the budget process. Working closely with Montenegro’s Ministry of Finance and with support from the World Bank’s SAFE trust fund, the Center of Excellence in Finance(CEF) identified authors with the right knowledge to assess the situation and offer recommendations for improvement. The Fiscal Impact Assessment of structural Reforms (FIASR) project is part of a long-term CEF program, Building Capacities for Policy Design and Implementation. The capacity development needs that the case studies have identified will be addressed through a series of CEF learning events entitled Strategic Planning and Budgeting from 2013 to 2015.

For this study, the working group of AIS focused on the most important structural reforms undertaken over the last 10 years in five sectors: Enterprise, Financial, Human Resource Development and Labor Market, Administrative Services, and Network Industry.

The main sources of data were taken from the Ministry of Finance, the Institute of Statistics, the Bank of Albania, line ministries and other responsible institutions, sector strategies, and the related legal framework in the five sectors examined, as well as signed agreements with other countries or international organizations. The European Commission’s progress reports on Albania and the reports from international organizations, such as the World Bank and UN, were also taken into consideration.

This case study consists of four sections. The first introduces the methodology used for this case. The second introduces the process of budgeting, not only its importance but reforms made during recent years, the legal framework, detailed procedures, and the main actors of this process. The third section focuses on the reforms undertaken in key sectors, institutions, and processes to include the cost of structural reforms in the state budget. The last section gives some conclusions and recommendations for all of the issues treated above.

Publication on the case study for Albania.

Link to the complete publication.